In governance circles, few topics generate more debate than whether the CEO should also serve as board chair. Regulators in some markets have taken firm positions, and activists often argue that separation between the two roles is a universal best practice.
But the empirical evidence tells a different story: serving as both chair and CEO is not inherently good or bad – in fact, CEOs who hold both roles tend to remain in office longer, by an average of three years, than peers who do not.
The more consequential issue is not formal structure, but how boards design leadership and oversight in an environment of shorter CEO tenures. As leadership cycles compress, the risk to long-term value lies in repeated strategic resets, erosion of institutional memory, and underinvestment in long-term priorities.
For boards and executives, the key is not conforming to a governance trend or reacting to external pressure. It is choosing a structure that fits the company’s long-term needs, explaining that choice transparently, and ensuring the board has the expertise, independence, and processes to govern effectively, regardless of who holds the gavel.
A growing body of research suggests that the impact of combining the CEO and chair roles is highly context-dependent and far from uniform.
A recent 2023 systematic review of 314 empirical studies finds that the relationship between combined CEO–chair structures and firm performance is highly mixed. Across studies, differences in research methodology, performance metrics, and contextual factors, such as governance regimes, ownership structures, and industry dynamics, studies report everything from negative correlations to positive effects to no statistically significant relationship at all. The authors conclude that no single leadership structure consistently outperforms the other.
Evidence from crisis contexts underscores this variability. A 2022 study examining U.S. firms during the early COVID-19 market shock found that combined CEO–chair structures were correlated with stronger returns — but only under extreme conditions of uncertainty, limited disclosure, and rapid change. Outside of crisis environments, the broader literature finds no meaningful difference in performance.
FCLTGlobal’s own long-term analysis reflects this broader pattern. Using ten-year ROIC as a measure of long-term value creation, we find no statistically significant performance gap between firms that combine the CEO and chair roles and those that separate them. Across thousands of company years, outcomes are broadly similar.
Taken together, the research points to one consistent conclusion: Leadership structure alone does not determine long-term performance. What matters is how leadership, governance, and incentives work together over time.
That distinction matters even more as CEO tenure continues to shorten, including at high-performing companies. Leadership turnover is no longer confined to underperformers. For boards and long-term investors, this raises a critical question: how to sustain long-term strategy, capital allocation discipline, and accountability when leadership cycles are increasingly compressed.
In that context, leadership structure often reflects a broader effort to preserve continuity and long-term orientation. FCLTGlobal’s latest analysis of S&P 500 companies shows that CEOs who also serve as chairs tend to have longer tenures, by three years on average, than peers who do not serve both roles.[1]
This does not mean that combining roles causes stability. Rather, it signals how boards are responding to the realities of modern CEO tenure and the demands of ensuring long-term value creation. Research suggests that while periodic leadership change can be healthy, many CEOs exit well before tenure begins to erode value, meaning tenures may be too short in practice. In response, some boards design leadership roles and oversight processes in ways that support longer-term decision-making, rather than constant resets.
Where the evidence does show effects, they tend to be conditional:
The difference is context, not structure.
Blanket rules often overstate the governance benefits of separating the CEO and chair roles. In practice, a firm with a strong lead independent director, rigorous board evaluation, transparent reporting, and a high-quality board will likely govern more effectively than a company with separate roles but weak oversight.
For CEOs and directors, the more constructive debate is not whether a combined CEO-chair structure is inherently good or bad, but whether the structure supports the company’s current strategy for long-term value creation.
A credible rationale does not need to be complicated:
What matters is not adherence to a governance norm, but alignment between leadership structure and long-term strategy. The research points to three conclusions:
FCLTGlobal thanks Sirius Tao and Mandy Zhao for research support on the data analysis of CEO tenure and leadership structure.
FCLTGlobal analysis 2026, data as of 12/31/2025; 46% of S&P firms have CEOs that also serve as chairs; 54% of firms do not. Analysis found a strong correlation between serving as both CEO and board chair and longer tenures (p-value=0.000).
Governance | Report
19 May 2025 - Companies — both public and private — strive to build boards that are instrumental in creating long-term value. But boards often feel they must follow somebody else's playbook. As companies grow, especially when they transition from private to public markets, they encounter a set of norms that governance experts expect them to follow. While some of these norms are listing requirements or laws that companies must follow, many are simply conventions rather than mandates.
Stakeholder Capitalism, Governance | Article
19 January 2022 - Political uncertainty needn’t capsize an organization’s long-term strategy. Rather, through good governance and investing in stakeholder engagement, businesses can cut through the noise of what’s expected of them and stay true to their purpose.
Governance | Report
19 July 2021 - Despite the evidence of the benefits of increased leadership diversity, progress at private companies has been slow.